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Abstract 
This study examined the level of voluntary disclosure of executive directors’ remuneration in Malaysia. The study period 
covered a period of significant changes in the Malaysian regulatory framework on disclosure over 2000 to 2008.  It applied an 
un-weighted disclosure index to determine a voluntary disclosure score that was determined as score of excess of the mandatory 
disclosure requirements. The study found a significant improvement in the level of voluntary score after the introduction of the 
reforms. However, they appeared to be exploitation of the weaknesses in the reforms that limited their effectiveness in 
improving the disclosure of executive directors’ remuneration. 
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1. Introduction 
In Malaysia, the annual average income per capita for the year 2011 was RM 28 725 (Economic Planning Unit, 
2011). On the other hand, an average remuneration of Malaysian executive director’s in 2011 was RM 824 000 
(Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group, 2011). The highest paid executive in 2010 was from Genting Berhad 
with a remuneration of RM 106 million (Chieh 2011). Although the level of Malaysian executive directors’ 
remuneration was not as exorbitant as their American counterparts, there was serious concern about the minimal 
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disclosure on remuneration policies and practices in the annual reports (Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group, 
2011). It was difficult for shareholders to gauge the performance of the executive directors’ in working for them 
and whether their remuneration was fair or excessive. It has not been surprising that a significant number of the pay 
and performance studies were done in the US where disclosure requirements had been extensive for some time. 
Andjelkovic et al. (2002) argued that the lack of disclosure meant that shareholders would not be able to scrutinize 
remuneration and to demand the board of directors place more emphasis on an association between pay and 
performance. The lack of scrutiny may mean that the board of directors would be lax in setting remuneration 
policies and disciplining executives. 
1.1. Malaysian regulatory framework on disclosure of executive directors’ remuneration 
Table 1.  Malaysian regulatory framework on disclosure. 
Year The changes or introduction of new regulations  
1996 Introduction of a timeframe for full disclosure based regulations by the Securities Commission  
2000 Disclosure of emoluments in the Companies Acts. 
2001 Introduction to the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance.  
Part 1(B) – link between remuneration and individual performance.  
Part 4(B) – disclosure of individual remuneration.  
Part 2(AA) – establishment of remuneration committee.  
2001 KLSE (Bursa Malaysia) Listing Rule – the mandatory disclosure of directors’ remuneration by bands 
2005 Introduction of MFRS 2 Share based payment – additional disclosure on share based payments to employers inclusive of directors 
2006 Introduction of MFRS 124 Related party disclosure – disclosure of remuneration of key management personnel  
Prior to 2001, there was no regulation that specified or recommended good corporate governance practices. 
Much was left to capital market to self-regulate.The East Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 brought attention 
to this glaring weakness. Subsequently, itled to the introduction of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 
(MCCG) in 2001. It was recommended that companies disclose individual director’s remuneration and a statement 
of the principles behind remuneration policies. . The regulators adopted a ‘hybrid method’ or ‘comply or justify’ 
method of corporate governance in implementation of the MCCG.This gave companies discretionary power on the 
extent of their disclosure. The Bursa Malaysia Listing Rules were also amended to include mandatory disclosure of 
directors’ remuneration by bands. This was followed by the harmonization of Malaysian accounting standards with 
the International Accounting Standards. The Financial Reporting Standard (FRS) 2 ‘Share based payments’ was 
introduced in 2005. It required reporting entities to disclose details of executives’ share based payments. The FRS 
124 ‘Related party disclosure’ was introduced in 1999 and was amended in 2005 to include disclosure of ‘key 
management personnel’ remuneration. These reforms were introduced to improve the level of transparency into the 
market and to restore investors’ confidence in the Malaysian capital market. The question is whether these reforms 
are effective in improving the transparency of remuneration practices and policies in Malaysia. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses developments 
The objective of this study is to examine the level of disclosure of Malaysian executive directors’ remuneration 
before and after the introduction of the reforms of the disclosure framework. Luo, Courtenay and Hossain (2006) 
argued that a disclosure rich environment like the US may not capture the influence of the theoretical determinants 
on the extent of disclosure. The adoption of an Anglo-American based corporate governance code in a developing 
Asian market with distinctive ownership and cultural characteristics, provides an interesting avenue in to study the 
extent and effectiveness of disclosure reforms. Chizema (2008) argued that the introduction of an Anglo-American 
corporate governance code that had been designed to maximise shareholders value may be resisted by institutional 
actors such as family owners and banks who had largely enjoyed controlling power over company policies. Prior 
studies have shown than corporations were resistant to the introduction of requirements to disclose details of 
executive remuneration especially individual remuneration and the valuation of executive options plans 
(Andjelkovic, Boyle, & McNoe, 2000; Chizema, 2008). This study will investigate whether there was similar 
resistance to the implementation of the reforms in Malaysian capital market and whether the reforms were 
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effective in improving the level of disclosure of executive directors’ remuneration.   
Earlier Malaysian studies focused on overall corporate governance measures (Zulkafli, Abdul Samad, & Ismail, 
2004) on factors that affect their implementation (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Mohd Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Ngui, 
Voon, & Lim, 2008) on the actual compliance of Malaysian firms with the corporate reforms(Christopher & 
Hassan, 2005); and on the impact of adopting corporate governance measures on firms or on Malaysian market 
indices (Abdul Wahab, How, & Verhoeven, 2007; Aik Leng & Abu Mansor, 2005; Nowland, 2008). These studies 
did not focus on the disclosure of Malaysian executive directors’ remuneration. Most of the studies examined the 
level of compliance after the introduction of the MCCG but did not consider the changes that followed the 
introduction of new accounting standards. 
One might presume that a study that examined disclosure in a regulated market is futile given that companies 
are obliged to disclose information and may choose not to disclose beyond that requirement. However, Dye (1986) 
contended that the introduction of mandatory disclosure requirements can improve the extent of voluntary 
disclosure. Naser and Nuseibeh(2003)studied the level of compliance of Saudi Arabian listed companies with 
mandatory disclosure requirements and the extent of voluntary disclosure in these companies. They found a 
positive and significant correlation (r=0.53, p<0.000) between the level of mandatory and voluntary disclosure for 
the total sample.This leads to the hypothesis that: 
H1: There was an improvement in the level of voluntary disclosure of executive directors’ remuneration after 
the reforms in Malaysian regulatory framework 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Sampling 
The sample period is from 2000 to 2008. This period covers the changes in the regulatory framework for 
directors’ remuneration disclosure. The year 2000 is a barometer for the effects of the regulatory reforms on the 
extent of disclosure as there was no regulation prior to and during that year. The MCCG and KLSE listing rules on 
disclosure of remuneration by bands first applied in 2001. The FRS 2 ‘Share based payments’ and FRS 124 
‘Related party transactions’ were introduced in 2005 and 2006 respectively. The nine year period allows for a 
learning period so that companies can adapt to the reforms. After allowing for changes in fiscal years, a total of 
1788 annual reports were collected for the 200 sample companies over the study period.  
3.2. Voluntary disclosure score  
The disclosure of executive directors’ remuneration was measured by applying a scoring index that was derived 
from Malaysian regulatory framework. It contained mandatory disclosure items as required by the FRS 2 and the 
Bursa Malaysia Listing rule and additional and voluntary disclosure items derived from Malaysian FRS 124, 
Australian AASB 124 ‘Related party disclosure’ and prior studies (Bassett, Koh, & Tutticci, 2007; Clarkson, Van 
Bueren, & Walker, 2006; Laksmana, 2008). 
Subsequently, the voluntary disclosure score was derived from the excess score that the company received after 
discounting score obtained from mandatory disclosure requirements. The maximum total score inclusive of 
mandatory and voluntary items is seventeen for companies that issued executive options and fourteen for other 
companies. Both the maximum mandatory and voluntary scores evolved throughout the study period depending on 
the regulatory framework that was introduced progressively over the nine years. 
Consistent with previous studies (Bassett, Koh & Tutticci 2007; Clarkson, P, Van Bueren & Walker 2006; 
Laksmana 2008), this study scores the disclosure items on a range of values instead of counting the words. Simply 
counting words may include repetitive sentences or lengthy but not meaningful sentences, and may exclude details 
provided by graphic representations and links to the number of directors in the board. Scoring based on values 
allows for the identification of minimum, maximum and excess values to distinguish between the mandatory and 
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voluntary disclosure of executive directors’ remuneration.   
The scoring was done manually by reading the annual reports in their entirety at first. The scoring was done on 
the second reading. Random and independent checks were done on at least 10% of the sample to ensure 
consistency in the scoring.  
3.3. Hypothesis testing 
As indicated by the Jarque-Bera test, the dataset that was obtained was skewed and the normality assumption is 
significantly rejected. This ruled out the validity of parametric tests. Thus, the hypothesis was tested by applying 
non-parametric median tests of Median 2, Kruskal- Wallies and Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon. The null hypothesis of 
these tests is that there are no differences in the median or mean ranks (for Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon) of the 
subgroups. 
4. Results and discussions 
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics for total voluntary score executive directors’ remuneration score from the period 2000 to 2008. 
Panel A 
  Mean  Median  Max  Min.  Std. Dev. 
2000 0.1988 0.1429 0.6471 0.0000 0.0845 
2001 0.4203 0.3846 0.8462 0.0769 0.1411 
2002 0.4817 0.4615 1.0000 0.2308 0.1291 
2003 0.5174 0.4615 1.0000 0.2308 0.1437 
2004 0.5449 0.5385 1.0000 0.2308 0.1446 
2005 0.5462 0.5385 1.0000 0.2308 0.1585 
2006 0.5577 0.5385 1.0000 0.2308 0.1584 
2007 0.5800 0.6154 1.0000 0.3077 0.1614 
2008 0.6104 0.6154 1.0000 0.0769 0.1667 
All 0.4949 0.4615 1.0000 0.0000 0.1864 
Median 2 test = 283.3632 *** 
Kruskal – Wallis (tie-adj.) = 633.9115*** 
Jarque-bera test = 15.4351 *** 
Panel B Result of Mann Whitney Wilcoxon(tie-adj) tests  
  Mean Rank Mean score Value 
YR 0001 2000 115.4650 -0.6509 
14.8433***  2001 285.5350 0.6832 
YR 0008 2000 104.0350 -0.7310 
16.8513***  2008 296.9650 0.7589 
YR 0108 2001 138.7225 -0.5060 
10.7199***  2008 262.2475 0.5096 
** *Significant at 1% level 
 

Fig. 1. Total voluntary score of disclosure executive directors’ remuneration from 2000 to 2008. 
The voluntary score measure consists of items that are reported in excess of the mandatory requirements of the 
Listing Rule and FRS 2. In year 2000, there was no disclosure requirement. Therefore all disclosure of executive 
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directors’ remuneration was voluntary. Table 2 indicates that there are large variations in the level of voluntary 
disclosure from a maximum voluntary score of one to none at all. The introduction of the MCCG in 2001 
significantly improved the level of voluntary disclosure from the previous year (p=0.0000). The average voluntary 
score consistently improved over the years. This is supported by the Mann Whitney Wilcoxon tests on 2000 and 
2008 and 2001 and 2008. However, there is a marked increase of minimum voluntary disclosure in 2007. This is 
consistent with the introduction of FRS 124 in 2006 that may have caused companies to voluntarily disclose more 
about executive directors’ remuneration as they formed part of companies’ ‘key management personnel’. The 
results provide further support for hypothesis that there was an improvement in the level of voluntary disclosure of 
executive directors’ remuneration in Malaysia. 
The minimum voluntary score trends appear to stabilize after 2001. However, there is a significant decline in 
the level of minimum disclosure in 2008. Low disclosure companies may initially disclose more information given 
the emphasis on remuneration in FRS 124 but eventually disclose less as it becomes clear that FRS 124 is very 
broad in its disclosure requirements. It only requires mandatory disclosure of ‘key management personnel’ 
remuneration but not for individual or total executive directors.  
5. Conclusions 
The improvement in the level of voluntary disclosure of executive directors’ remuneration after the reforms 
provided a positive indicator of the move to greater corporate transparency and good governance after the East 
Asian financial crisis. The study found that there were declining trends in the years between new disclosure 
requirements. Malaysian companies appear to take advantage of the broad terms of the MCCG and accounting 
standards and inconsistencies within the disclosure framework. They fall back to the practice of disclosing the 
minimum of the mandatory requirements and disclosing less voluntary information. This is contrary to the 
recommendations of the reforms. There is also a need to consider the impact of the traditional dominance of family 
and substantial shareholders in the implementations and enforcement of existing and future regulations. Under this 
environment, a ‘hybrid’ approach to regulations may need to give way to a stronger mandatory and prescriptive 
regulatory framework.

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